If any reader were to look at the Jerusalem Post or the rest of the Israeli media at the moment they would see that the principal concern over the uprising in Egypt is whether a new Egyptian government will maintain the 1979 peace treaty negotiated by Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin.Indeed, everything about winds of change sweeping through the Arab world is seen by the Israelis in terms of what will the consequences be for Israel.
That is the view of many Americans too. It is remarkable how much time US TV news stations and newspapers have devoted to the subject, in particular to the “dangers” (as they put it) of the Muslim Brotherhood taking power in Egypt. They clearly see the changes in Egypt and potentially elsewhere in the Arab world as a slide away from stability — albeit in some cases stability based on repression — toward Islamist governments taking over. They evidently prefer the old order.
Of course, every state puts its own interests first. But for a country that sells itself to international public opinion, particularly in the US, as the only real, working democracy in the Middle East, it seems bizarre that Israel has not welcomed the fall of Hosni Mubarak with open arms. Here was people power in action.
The fact is that Arab freedom terrifies the Israelis. In the case of Egypt, they know they will find it extremely difficult to ignore its views and demands once a government in Cairo is freely chosen by the Egyptian people — and seen to be freely chosen. It will have a credibility and an authority in international eyes that it never had before. The pressure on Israel to negotiate seriously with it will be massive.
What Israel wants in its Arab neighbors is either governments like Mubarak’s that maintain a cold peace with it or states in a degree of turmoil. Not too much turmoil. It does not want them in total collapse like Somalia or Iraq three or four years ago. That would open the door to direct action by Al-Qaeda. It wants them to have sufficient internal problems as to incapacitate them and so prevent them standing up to it. Lebanon is the perfect example.
The Israelis could help consolidate Lebanese state authority by denying Hezbollah the excuse for holding on to its military arsenal which it uses to maintain political power in the country. If they gave back the Shebaa farms and recognized Lebanon’s border, Hezbollah could no longer claim to be Lebanon’s protector. Any refusal at that point on its part to disarm would expose its real agenda, that of wanting to control Lebanon.
The Shebaa farms have no military or economic value for the Israelis. Giving them back would cost them nothing and could help stabilize Lebanon. By refusing to do so, thus giving Hezbollah the excuse of maintaining itself as an armed force, shows that what the Israelis really want is a crippled and ineffective Lebanon.
That is what they want throughout the Arab world. That is why they are so disturbed by the winds of change blowing through the region. It is bringing in a new and authoritative voice for the Arabs. That frightens them.
